Abstract. In this paper we present a comparison of certain inconsistency adaptive logics and Jaśkowski's logic.
Introduction
One of the first formal ways of handling inconsistency was presented in [11] . The approach opened the way to further investigations concerning paraconsistent logic. In time the importance of so called M -fragments of a given modal logic was also discovered.
Another approach is given by D. Batens. The whole project started with the paper [1] . The idea is very attractive and can be applied to many different logical calculi.
Inconsistency adaptive logics
The adaptive logics are built with the help of two consequences relations: a weaker one (in the case of inconsistency adaptive logics it is a paraconsistent logic) and a stronger (classical logic). You can always derive a conclusion from given premises using the first kind of consequences relation, while in some cases we can use the second one. The cases in which the stronger consequence relation is allowed are determined by a given strategy. Logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2 are the most famous. In what follows, we will refer only to the propositional part of these logics, since the most important features of the predicative formulations are retained in the propositional versions.
In both these logics, the logic CLuN is the lower limit logic. The propositional case of the logic CLuN is defined as the full positive classical logic plus the law of excluded middle.
Let us recall a very important theorem from [2] which was originally expressed for the propositional case.
⊢ CL A iff there are C 1 , . . . , C n (n 0) that ⊢ CLuN DEK(C 1 , . . . , C n ) ∨ A.
This suggests rules of inference for inconsistency adaptive logics.
In the proofs of inconsistency adaptive logics every formula is added under assumption of consistent behavior of some set of formulas. If the set of assumptions under which a given formula is added to the proof, is the empty set, we say that the formula appears unconditionally in the proof.
We only recall the meta-rules which govern the inferences for ACLuN1 logic. It is enough for our purposes since in the case of consistent sets of premisses both consequences coincide, while in general if X ⊢ ACLuN1 A then X ⊢ ACLuN2 A. For the exhaustive formulations of semantics and syntax of both logics, see for example [3] .
We say that a formula of the form (C 1 ∧ ∼ C 1 ) ∨ · · · ∨ (C m ∧ ∼ C m ) is a minimally inconsistent disjunction in a given proof if it appears in the proof unconditionally and no formula of the form (C i 1 ∧ ∼ C i 1 ) ∨ · · · ∨ (C i k ∧ ∼ C i k ) where k < m, appears in the given proof unconditionally.
A formula of the form (C 1 ∧ ∼ C 1 ) ∨ · · · ∨ (C m ∧ ∼ C m ) is a minimally inconsistent consequence of a given set X iff it is a consequence of X in the sense of the logic CLuN and no formula of the form (C i 1 ∧ ∼ C i 1 ) ∨ · · · ∨ (C i k ∧ ∼ C i k ) where k < m, is a consequence of X. Here are the rules: RU If ⊢ CLuN (A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n ) → B and A 1 , . . . , A n appears in the proof, B can be added. The assumption under which B is derived is the sum of assumptions under which formulas A 1 , . . . , A n appeared in the proof.
and A 1 , . . . , A n appears in the proof, then B can be added provided that no formula of the form C i ∧∼ C i for all 1 i n occurs as the disjunct of a minimally inconsistent disjunction in that proof. The appropriate assumption is the sum of assumptions under which formulas A 1 , . . . , A n appeared in the proof plus the set {C 1 , . . . , C m }.
RD It is obligatory that if A has been inferred under an assumption of consistent behavior of a set containing a formula B, and the formula B ∧ ∼ B became a disjunct of a minimally inconsistent disjunction, then A has to be deleted from the proof.
Using the above meta-rules one can formulate the notion of a proof of a given formula on the basis of a set of premises X. But since RD can cause the deletion of a step in a proof, the notion of final derivability has to be introduced. We say that A is finally derived on the basis of premises the set X iff there is a proof of A on the basis of that set, in which A appears under some assumption ∆, and even if A were deleted in some extension of the proof, it could be further extended in such a way that A is derived under ∆ once more. For our purposes the notion of a model is needed. By CLuN-model we mean any valuation v classical with respect to positive connectives, while in the case of negation for any A the following is fulfilled: v(A) = 1 or v(∼ A) = 1. In the standard way we semantically define the consequence relation for CLuN.
A CLuN-model v is the ACLuN1 model of a given set X iff it satisfies X and the only formulas of the form B ∧ ∼ B valid under v are disjuncts of minimally inconsistent semantical consequences of the set X.
Since for the logic CLuN the completeness result is valid, the word 'semantical' can be dropped in the last paragraph.
A CLuN-model v is the ACLuN2 model of a given set X iff it satisfies X and it is a minimally inconsistent CLuN-model of X, i.e., there is no CLuN-model of X, which would have validated fewer inconsistences.
Jaśkowski's Logic D 2
Jaśkowski's logic D 2 is a propositional logic defined with the help of the modal logic S5.
A formula A is a theorem of the system D 2 iff it is built in the standard way with the help of '↔', '→', '∧', '∨' and '∼', and the formula 3A ′ , which arises by the substitution of
The notion of the theorem of D 2 can be expressed more accurately. Let us use the following definition of Jaśkowski's transformation: Definition 1. By a Jaśkowski's transformation we mean the function (·) d : For −→ For m from the set of all propositional formulas into the set of all modal propositional formulas, defined by induction for any A ∈ For:
Jaśkowski's logic defined with the help of M-fragment of the modal logic P we call set:
i.e., for A ∈ For: A ∈ P J iff 3A d ∈ P . By the above definition we have:
Connectives of conjunction, implication and equivalence can be treated as abbreviations of some modal formulas. In this sense we can call them "discussive" and denote them with the additional symbol ' d ':
Now we can define the consequence relation by saying that from A 1 , . . . , A n a formula A is derivable in the sense of D 2 iff on the basis of
Proposition 2. The Logic D 2 is closed under the Modus Ponens rule:
Proof. It is enough to see that the following rule is provable in S5:
Let us assume that in a given proof 3(3A → B) and 3A appears. By Lemma 23 from p. 24 one can derive 3A → 3B, therefore by the rule of Modus Ponens (being used in S5) we get 3B.
Jaśkowski's logic and inconsistency adaptive logics
In the present section we will compare Jaśkowski' logic and inconsistency adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2. To achieve this aim connectives of implication, conjunction and equivalence will be treated as discussive ones. Firstly, let us notice that each axiom of the logic CLuN is a theorem of the logic D 2 : a fortiori the full positive logic is contained in D 2 . Corollary 4 was implicite expressed already by Jaśkowski (see [11] and [12] ). We present its full proof here. 
Ax1.
A As a consequence of the last theorem and Proposition 2 we obtain:
However, the analogous observation does not hold for adaptive logics built on CLuN as the lower limit logic:
Proposition 5. The adaptive logics ACLuN1 and ACLuN2 are crossing with D 2 .
Proof. Since for any set of formulas X and a formula A holds [2, 3] ) and simultaneously, if X is a consistent set, then
On the other hand, one can observe that {p, ∼ p} ACluN2 ∼(p ∧ ∼ p). Indeed, minimally inconsistent CLuN-models of our premises do not validate the formula ∼(p∧∼ p) (the formula {p∧∼ p} is a CLuN consequence of the set of our premises and there is no CLuN-model of our premises which would validate fewer inconsistencies). Since in general X ⊢ ACLuN 1 A ⇒ X ⊢ ACLuN2 , the same observation holds for the ACLuN1 consequence:
Since on the basis of the premises one can unconditionally derive p ∧ ∼ p, while only assuming consistent behavior of p one can derive ∼(p ∧ ∼ p).
Lemma 6. Let KD * T * is the normal modal logic arising by extension of the logic K with the axioms:
In KD * T * the following formulas are provable:
(MP), the law of identity, and
1 and the monotonicity rule 3. 3(A → A) (MP), 2 and (D * )
the law of syllogism, 1 and 2 4. 223(A ∨ B) → 233B ∨ 323A 3, monotonicity rule and t4
the law of syllogism, 4 and 5 7. 233B → 32233B the substitution to the version of (T * ): A/(33B) 8. 32233B → 323B the axiom (T * ) and monotonicity rules 9. 233B → 323B the law of syllogism, 7 and 8 10.
the law of syllogism, 6 and 10
the law of syllogism, 11 and 12 14. 3(23(A ∨ B) → (23A ∨ 23B)) 13 and t5
the commutativity rule, the law of syllogism, 5, 3 and 1
the commutativity rule and 6 8.
9, laws of extensionality and t5
10, extensionality and t5
11 and (RG)
the axiom (T * ), 12 and (MP)
Ad (DN3) We will prove an auxiliary theorem:
1, extensionality and t5
(MP), 2, 3 and 4
Using the rule of contraposition to (DN3 ′ ), where ∼ A is substituted for A we get:
is arising by the condition (1), via de Morgan's law:
6, contraposition, de Morgan's law and (1)
the axiom D and addition of a new disjunct to arguments of an implication 2.
1 and the monotonicity rules
the law of syllogism, 2 and 3
Theorem 7. The minimal normal logic, which contains axioms 3(Ax1) d -3(Ax13) d , closed with respect to the rule:
is the logic KD * T * , i.e., KD
Proof. Firstly, we will show that each of axioms
1 and the classical logic 3. 23A → (23B → 3A)
2 and the commutativity law 4. 3(3A → (3B → A)) 3, t5 and extensionality rule Ad Ax d 2. Let us start with the observation, that in the considered logic the following theorem is provable:
Indeed:
1 and the addition of a new disjunct to arguments of an implication 3.
3, 4 and the law of syllogism 10 and the monotonicity rules
extensionality and regularity 13.
the law of syllogism 4, 5, 8, 11 and 12
14, the law of negation of '→' and condition (1)
15 and t5
16 and t5
Ad Ax d 4. Ad Ax d 6.
1 and the monotonicity rule
the law of syllogism, 3 and 2 5. 3(3A → (3B → A ∧ 3B)) 4 and t5
Ad Ax d 7.
1. 3A → 3(A ∨ B) the absorption law and the monotonicity rule
the law of syllogism, 2 and 1 4. 3(3A → A ∨ B) 3 and t5
Ad Ax d 8. I.e., 3(3B → A ∨ B). The proof is analogous.
. This is just the formula (DN2) from Lemma DN1.
Ad Ax d 10.
Ad Ax d 11.
Ad Ax d 12.
Ad Ax d 13.
the disjunctive syllogism and the extensionality 3. 3(3(3A → ∼ A) → ∼ A) t5 and the condition (1)
Let us assume that 3A ∈ KD * T * and 3(3A → A) ∈ KD * T * . By (RG) and t5 we have that 23A ∈ KD * T * and 23A → 3A ∈ KD * T * . So, by (MP) we have 3A ∈ KD * T * .
In the opposite direction, it is easy to see that axioms (D * ) and (T * ) cannot be omitted by postulated minimality -indeed these axioms are just appropriate substitutions of some the axioms Ax d 1-Ax d 13:
1, idempotency and extensionality 3. 233A → 3A 2 and t5
and extensionality 3. 23A → 3A 2 and t5
Lemma 8. The axiom (T * ) is equivalent to the formula 2A → 322A.
Proof. obvious: contraposition of the substitution of (T * ): A/ ∼ A and the condition (1).
Lemma 9. The axiom (D * ) is equivalent to the formula 2A → 32A.
Proof. is analogous to the previous one.
Let us recall:
Theorem 10 (Furmanowski [7] ). 3S4 = 3S5.
The following logic is formulated by Perzanowski ([14]).
Definition 11. S5 M is the normal logic defined with the help of following axioms:
with the additional rule (RT * ) 33A 3A
Theorem 10 follows from the stronger theorem:
Theorem 12 (Perzanowski [14] ). S5 M is the minimal normal logic for which the set of all its theorems which start with '3' is equal to 3S5.
We'll prove this theorem, simplifying Perzanowski's axioms. Let us notice that in [14] Perzanowski gave the general method of axiomatization of Mfragments of normal logics, not only of S5.
Firstly we show that Perzanowski's system is equivalent the system introduced in Lemma 6. The theorem by Dziobiak is presented here with the full proof:
Proof. We show that using given axiomatization one can prove specific axioms and the rule of the logic S5 M . Let us notice that:
the law of negation of '→' and the condition (1)
2 and the monotonicity rule
the law of negation of '→' and condition (1)
the law of syllogism and 1, 3 and 4 It is easy to see that the rule (RT * ) is provable:
(MP), 2 and 3
In the opposite direction we show that the formulas (T * ) and (D * ) belong to S5 M . Indeed we have:
the monotonicity rule and In the proof of the schema (T * ) we use the schema (D * ).
the monotonicity rule and 1 3. 2233A → 33A the law of syllogism, 2 and 1
t5 and the monotonicity rule 6. 33(33A → A) 2 × (MP), 3, 4 and 5 7. 3(33A → A) the rule (RT * ) and 6 8.
(MP), 7 and 8
Proof of Theorem 12. Let 3A ∈ S5. There exists a S5-proof:
Let us consider a sequence of formulas 32D 1 ,. . . , 32D n = 323A. We show the construction of the S5 M -proof of the formula 323A.
The proof goes by induction on 1 i n. By the induction hypothesis, for each k < i there exists in the sense of the logic S5 M a proof of the formula 32D k . We show how to construct an analogous sequence for 32D i . If in the given sequence the formula D i is either the axiom (T) or (5), then in both cases 32D i is also provable as an axiom of the logic S5 M . If on the other hand D i is either the axiom (K) or a classical theorem, then 32D i can be easily also proved in the sense of S5 M : we use Gödel's rule twice with D i obtaining in this way the antecedent of the substitution of the axiom (D):
The consequent of this substitution is the required formula. If, however, D i is of the form 2D j , for some j < i, then by the induction hypothesis for j there exists in S5 M a proof of formula 32D j . By Lemma 8 and the monotonicity rule the given be the induction hypothesis sequence we can extend with steps k + 1-k + 4: ⊢ S5 M 32D j by the induction hypothesis l+k.
l+k+1 and the monotonicity rule l+k+3. 3322(D j → D i ) (MP), l+k and l+k+2 l+k+4. 2232D j → 3332D i the axiom (K) and t1, t5 l+k+5. 2232D j 2 × (RG) and l. l+k+6. 3332D i (MP) and l+k+4, l+k+5 l+k+7. 23332D i (RG) and l+k+6 l+k+8.
(MP), l+k+7 and l+k+8 l+k+10. 2332D i (RG) and l+k+9 l+k+11. 2332D i → 32D i the axiom (T * ): A/(2D i ) l+k+12. 32D i (MP), l+k+10 and l+k+11 which ends the inductive proof. So, for i = n we have ⊢ S5 M 323A. By the axiom (D * ), the provable in S5 M rule of monotonicity and (MP) we have: ⊢ S5 M 33A, while by Gödel's rule, with the help of the axiom (T * ) we conclude that ⊢ S5 M 3A. Since all our axioms belongs to the M -fragment of S5, so the postulated minimality S5 M is stated.
Semantics of the logic S5 M
Now we give conditions for frames which establish the completeness result for the logic under consideration. We'll use Theorem 13 and the following observations semantically characterizing logic KD * T * .
Theorem 14.
A formula is valid in all frames satisfying the condition
iff it is provable in the logic K extended with
Proof. "⇐" Using the standard procedure, via Lemma 34 from p. 26 it is enough to show that the axiom (D * ) is valid in each frame satisfying the given condition. We assume to the contrary, that there is a frame satisfying the condition ( ), where the formula (D * ) is not valid, so there is a world w and some valuation v, that w |= v (D * ), i.e., w |= v 23p and w |= v 3p. By the definition of the notion of the truth at a world for '3' we have w |= v p for all worlds w, where wRw; in particular, we have w ′ |= v p for the world w ′ postulated in the condition ( ). By the assumption and the definition of truth for '2', we see that w ′ |= v 3p, thus there is w ′′ , that w ′ Rw ′′ and w ′′ |= v p, however by ( ) we obtain wRw ′′ , i.e., w |= v 3p which is a contradiction. "⇒" Let us consider the canonical model of the logic D * . Firstly we show that for each world w, the set {A : 2A ∈ w} ∪ {2A : 2A ∈ w} is consistent with respect to D * . Assume otherwise, i.e., there are formulas
and on the basis of the logic K using t2 and obvious induction we get
, while using the absorption law for conjunction we obtain
as A. Our observations can be written as follows:
. Apparently 2A ∈ w; by the law of adjunction of implications we have:
, and via the law of
. Therefore, by the assumption and Modus Ponens, we have: ⊢ D * ¬(A ∧ 2A), equivalently ⊢ D * 2A → ¬A. By Gödel's rule and t1 we conclude ⊢ D * 32A → ¬2A. Using Lemma 9 and the law of syllogism we get ⊢ D * 2A → ¬2A, i.e., ¬2A ∈ w, therefore 2A ∈ w. However 2A ∈ w, which is a contradiction.
We are ready to prove that the accessibility relation R of the canonical model fulfills the condition ( ). Since the set W = {A : 2A ∈ w} ∪ {2A : 2A ∈ w} is consistent with respect to D * , there is thus a maximally consistent set w ′ containing W, by the definition of the accessibility relation in the canonical model we state that wRw ′ . Indeed, if 2A ∈ w, then A ∈ W ⊆ w ′ . Let w ′′ be any set that w ′ Rw ′′ . We prove that wRw ′′ . Let us assume that 2B ∈ w. By the definition of w ′ clearly 2B ∈ w ′ , but since w ′ Rw ′′ , so B ∈ w ′′ .
Thus the canonical model of the logic D * belongs to the class of models fulfilling ( ), then if some formula is valid in all frames satisfying the condition ( ), it is also valid in the canonical model, but by Lemma 36 each formula valid in the canonical model, is provable in D * .
Theorem 15. A formula is valid in all frames fulfilling the condition
iff it is provable in the logic K with the axiom T * , i.e., in K[T * ] (= T * ).
Proof. "⇐" We prove the the axiom T * is valid in each frame fulfilling the given condition. Assume to the contrary that there exists a frame fulfilling the condition (⊛), in which the formula T * is refuted. Then there is a world w and valuation v, that w |= v T * , i.e., w |= v 233p and w |= v 3p. The last condition via the definition of truth says that w |= v p for all possible worlds w, such that wRw, i.e., we also have w |= v p for w, which is postulated by (⊛). By the assumption w |= v 233p and the conditions of truth for '2' for '3' there are worlds w ′ and w ′′ , that wRw ′ , w ′ Rw ′′ and w ′′ |= v p, then by the condition (⊛) we get wRw ′′ , i.e., w |= v 3p which is a contradiction.
"⇒" We follow the proof of the previous theorem. Let us consider the canonical model of the logic T * . We prove the canonical frame satisfies (⊛). Let us start with the observation that for each possible world w, the set of formulas {A : 2A ∈ w} ∪ {22A : 2A ∈ w} is T * -consistent. Assume otherwise, i.e., there are formulas
. By the law of absorption we have
while on the basis of K, and via t2 we get 22(
, thus once more using the law of absorption for conjunction we see that
by A, then the above observations can be written:
thus via the law of adjunction also
and using the law of addition of implications we state:
, by the contraposition law and the assumption we have: ⊢ T * ¬(A ∧ 22A), equivalently ⊢ T * 22A → ¬A. By Gödel's rule and t1 we deduce that ⊢ T * 322A → ¬2A. By Lemma 8 we have ⊢ T * 2A → 322A, and by the law of syllogism we get ⊢ T * 2A → ¬2A, i.e., ¬2A ∈ w, contrary to the earlier observation.
We show that canonical frame of the logic T * satisfies the condition (⊛). The set {A : 2A ∈ w} ∪ {22A : 2A ∈ w} is consistent with respect to T * , so it is contained in a maximally consistent set. Let us denote it by w. By the definition of the accessibility relation in the canonical frame we get wRw. Let w ′ , w ′′ be any possible world such that wRw ′ and w ′ Rw ′′ . We show that wRw ′′ . Let us assume that 2B ∈ w, by the definition of the world w we see that 22B ∈ w, by via the assumption about w ′ and w ′′ we get 2B ∈ w ′ and B ∈ w ′′ , since B was any formula, we have wRw ′′ . The rest of the proof follows in the standard way, as in the previous theorem.
The above semantical conditions express a kind of weaker version of the condition of transitivity of the relation R. Therefore obviously these theorems can be generalized:
Theorem 16. A formula is valid in all frames fulfilling the condition
iff it is provable in logic K with the axiom 2 3 . . .
Proof. It is analogous.
There follows an easily-provable corollary:
Corollary 17. Formulas (T * ) and (D * ) are independent on the basis of K.
Proof. We point out a model whose frame fulfills ( ) but does not fulfill the condition (⊛).
W := {w, w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, the relation R between possible worlds is indicated with arrows, which ends in the second argument of an ordered pair. One can easily see that in the world w formula 233p → 3p is not satisfied, while formula D * is true in the model.
Now let us consider a model which for which the condition (⊛) is satisfied, and the condition ( ) is not satisfied. Let W = {w, w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }. In each world the formula (T * ) is satisfied, while the formula D * is not satisfied in the world w.
The logic Triv is the normal modal logic defined by adding to D, the axiom (Triv)
A → 2A or equivalently 3A → A.
For each of those logics one can define a consequence relation allowing (MP) to be the only rule of inference. For example we have:
Definition 18. We say that a given formula A is S5-provable on the basis of X (notation: X ⊢ S5 A) iff there is a sequence of formulas C 1 , . . . , C n = A, where for each 1 i n: C i ∈ X either C i is a theorem of S5, or arises by (MP) from earlier formulas in the that sequence, 4
Proof. "⇒" By t6 we have ⊢ K 3(A ∧ 3B) → 3A ∧ 33B. And by Lemma 22 we obtain ⊢ S5 3A ∧ 33B → 3A ∧ 3B. "⇐" Using classical logic and S5 we have ⊢ S5 (3A∧3B) → (3A∧23B), and substituting 3B for B in the formula t7 we see that ⊢ K 3A ∧ 23B → 3(A ∧ 3B).
Let us introduce the following notation: For any modal logic P , we define the set 3P := {3A : 3A ∈ P } which is called the M -fragment of the logic P .
For any modal logic P , let M(P) := {A ∈ For m : 3A ∈ P }, where For m is the set of all modal formulas. The set M(P ) is called M-analogon of the logic P . Definition 30. A formula A is valid in frame W, R iff it is true in all models based on W, R .
Definition 31. 1. Logic P is complete with respect to the class of frames C iff (a formula A is a theorem of P iff A is valid in each frame from C.
In that case we say that frames of the class C are P -frames.
2. Any frame in which all theorems of a given modal logic P are valid we call a frame for P .
Definition 32. A is a S5-consequence of the set X (notation: X |= S5 A) iff for any model W, R, v with equivalence accessibility-relation and for any w ∈ W if w |= v X then w |= v A.
Lemma 33. 1. S5-frames are frames with the equivalence accessabilityrelation.
X ⊢ S5
A iff X |= S5 A.
Let us recall the classical:
Lemma 34. (a) The axiom K is valid in any frame.
(b) All classical tautologies are valid in each frame.
(c) The set of all formulas valid in a given frame is closed under Gödel's rule, (MP) and substitution.
Definition 35. The set X of formulas is inconsistent with respect to the modal logic P (or shortly P -inconsistent) iff there are formulas A 1 , . . . .A n ∈ X, such that ⊢ P ¬(A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n ). The set X is consistent with respect to the modal logic P (or shortly P -consistent) iff it not P -inconsistent.
We have also:
Lemma 36. All maximally consistent sets with respect to the modal logic P contain P and are closed under (MP).
Finally let us recall the definition of a compact logic:
Definition 37. A logic P is compact iff for every P -consistent set of formulas X, there is a world w in some model M based on a frame for P , such that all the formulas in X are true in that world in M .
